Inside the Headquarters

While the embattled service chiefs take on tremendous challenges in procurement and recruiting, as the Navy itself faces an uncertain future, especially in trying to break the 300-ship barrier, a small group of well-placed Naval Academy graduates are suing, well, some other well-placed Naval Academy graduates. 

Does it get much pettier? We think not. 

In an episode of what could be tabloid TV’s, “America’s Most Bizarre Lawsuits,” it seems members of U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1964 have sued the Naval Academy Alumni Association. (Well, they’ve sued the association and 28 of 29 trustees. They decided not to serve the Marine fighting in Iraq.) 

Our boys from ‘64 allege some of the Alum Chums’ officers are violating the group’s bylaws by exceeding mandated term limits. The larger issue gleaned from many lengthy e-mails is outrage over the Chums’ “clubbiness” and, well, detrimental chumminess. They also allege the group’s bylaws are ambiguous. (Did we mention that this plunges pettiness to news depths?) Who cares? Well, we didn’t until we learned there’s a back story here of (petty) power and control, coupled with some long-standing (petty) grudges. 

According to a source familiar with this fodder for a Jerry Springer special, it seems a member of Club ’64 who happens to be a prominent retired Marine might be calling the shots for the boys. It might be that his epic feud (details of which we will leave to rest in the Yard) with the Academy and the Alumni Association has culminated in legal action whose effect the boys might have overestimated. 

After years of (petty) frustration with Alum Chum leadership, Club ’64 took action. In 2005, our machine boss Marine put up a best bud for Alum Chum Chairman before the Chums’ Nominating Committee, the entity that decides which nominees go forward on the ballot to all alums. Get this: Best Bud was not selected and Machine Marine was mad. 

Despite this setback, what good machine doesn’t have a loyal sap on the inside feeding it info? In this case the “dissidents,” as the boys call themselves, believed it enough ammo to go after the Alum Chums in court. Though we have nothing indicating why, our guess is this move was an attempt to wrestle control away from the Chums and place one of Main Marine’s patsies in power. 

A judge recently tossed the case. It seems the “dissidents” have decided to appeal the decision.

Agree or disagree with Esquire magazine’s portrayal of now-retired former CENTCOM Chief Adm. Mike Fallon, the fallout might send a chill throughout the flag community. 

The article that appeared in the popular magazine’s April issue focused on Fallon, the man it labeled as one between “war and peace.” Highlighting some thoughtful quotes, the flattering (fawning?) piece made Fallon’s views appear at odds with White House policies regarding the war in Iraq. One only can imagine politico surprise. Did Fallon plan this? Was this a way to walk out without having to say, “I’m done!”? Was it an altruistic move in which he was throwing his body on the grenade? (We’re pushing back into fiction, aren’t we?) 

We are sure the Fallon Affair (has a nice ring to it!) is bad news for everyone (except maybe Esquire and Fallon). The losers are numerous news outlets and the hapless hacks that fight their way into interview these gods of battle. Readers who faithfully slug through countless column inches or flip through cable news’ pathetic offerings lose, too. The Fallon Affair is bad for the news business. 

While writers can get by without interviews from the stars, there is a je ne sais quoi that the star du jour can lend. A quote from the Big Guy certainly makes for a more compelling and credible piece. “Hey, if Admiral Bob or General Joe says it, it must be true, and the person writing this is credible.” (And thus the flap over Fallon’s comments.) It has been reported that Fallon balked publicly at his portrayal after the article hit newsstands, but the damage had been done, and we’re not so sure he was so surprised. 

It is the candid, overarching perspective that the flag types can lend. The more candid, the more intimate, the more compelling the story, and that’s good for everyone. Those who have had the misfortune of being themed-and-messaged to death, stand by. At least for the near future it seems reasonable that some of these guys will cling to strat-comm-hack crafted messages. (Gack.) 

Fallon will go on to bigger things. Esquire will make money; maybe stand to win a literary prize. It is we word slaves and the flags that are caught in the aftermath of the Fallon Affair who have been thrown under the bus.

Defense contracting seems especially chummy of late. Who knew routine purchases would become fraught with such abuse it would become the seedy playground for conmen and miscreants. In a world where officers are assumed to act with honesty, a bunch of these guys seem to be conducting themselves as the thugs and the not-so-petty thieves they are. 

Some of the most recent examples involve the much-beleaguered Air Force. After the Boeing debacle in which a top Air Force official steered contracts Boeing’s way, we’re not sure how they didn’t figure out they had a problem. In this latest (but probably not final) chapter, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and the FBI have started issuing subpoenas in a case in which it seems the Air Force awarded a suspect sole-source contract to an unknown Pennsylvania intelligence nonprofit entity, Commonwealth Research Institute. 

This scandalous behavior is not unique to the Air Force, and the government’s watchdog, the GAO, has issued a number of reports highlighting areas of concern. The Army has had its share of criminal contracting capers. In a complex example one officer had been running his operation from the Middle East while his family helped out stateside. Recently, the Army stood up its new contracting command to better manage the contracting process, though we remain convinced it only will streamline criminal activity and teach government conmen how to better cover their tracks. (Yes, we should be writing dime-store crime novels.)
Our recent favorite criminal controversy has to be “What’s $50 Million Among Friends?” It seems in 2005, the Air Force worked to “reward” a recently retired four star (not too many of those) and his millionaire buddy. At stake: a $50 million contract for event-size video boards to enhance the Air Force aerobatic team, the Thunderbirds, performances. (We’re not sure when watching the aircraft in the sky became so mundane that “Thundervision” (gack!) was needed.) Regardless, a certain two-star (who now is reportedly the vice director of the Joint Staff apparently made his contract award preferences known to the selection team. (“Did not!” seemed to be the gist of the story he gave investigators.) It seems the selection team listened, and now investigators are looking at the 99th Contracting Squadron because of “systemic weaknesses” and “irregularities that have overtaken the unit.” 

Given the volume of contracts and lack of oversight (not to mention lowered accession standards) our guess is the negative trend will continue. Great for those of us who thrive on the low-brow, bad news for defense denizens.

Recently, The New York Daily News reported as only it can: “NATO’s command in Afghanistan fessed up to a bonehead blunder…” The story, “Our Bad! NATO Arms, Ammo Land in Taliban Territory,” seemed to be but a footnote about an errant delivery and a curious commentary on how the princes of print cover current ops.

Stories are not always as they seem, and this gem might not be about a “bonehead blunder” at all. The writer might have stumbled on what was, in fact, a covert operation (what isn’t nowadays?) and possibly one with the little-known Afghan commandos. The resulting story might have been spun by NATO officials to protect an operation. 

Conspiracy theory? Maybe, but we found this tabloid tidbit so interesting we mentioned it to a source who has knowledge on the subject. Our general questions about the incident were met with silence. [Cue more silence.] “Ahhhhh! We think we see the real story.” 

As reported in late March, a NATO-contracted chopper dropped ammo, rocket-propelled grenades, food and water onto a Taliban-controlled mountaintop. No details on the contract company, type of bird, or air crew were given. (CIA?) According to NATO officials, it was NATO that gave the pilots bad scoop, sending them to the wrong area. The Daily News also reported, after a crew makes a drop, it is supposed to hang around and see if “friendlies” are going to make the pick-up. Not this contract crew: they took off, and it is unclear why. Their bad, again? 

No bad. Queries on contracting aviation assets in Afghanistan turned up, well, more silence. The items that were dropped? Sounds like a resupply for a small unit of Afghan commandos (maybe other special-forces units) working in Taliban territory. Bad map coordinates? Possibly, but unlikely with small-unit resupply missions in Afghanistan. Maybe that helo left the drop-zone area because it did not want to draw attention to the covert boys on the ground. (Maybe we should start writing stereotyped fiction.) 

Maybe we’re naïve, but a “bonehead blunder” such as this one is unlikely. The Daily News article might be more a glimpse into underreported (or covert) operations in Afghanistan.

It seems just about anyone can sign up to be a defense contractor and win lucrative contracts. Take for example the 22-year-old who secured munitions contracts with the Army — and delivered decades-old decomposing ammo.

The Army awarded a $298 million contract to AEY Inc., an otherwise faceless company based in Miami. Entrepreneur and alleged conman Efraim E. Diveroli, the barely-old-enough–to-drink company president reportedly worked with a number of middlemen and at least one shell company on the government’s list of those suspected of illegal arms trafficking to obtain his wares. We admire young entrepreneurs, and maybe he thought he was getting legit goods. Regardless, AEY has been suspended in the wake of the controversy, and it appears the company had been under government surveillance for some time. It has been reported that problems with AEY became apparent in the fall 2007 when one Afghan commander noted receiving ammo manufactured circa 1966 in China. The most recent decaying shipment was headed to the Afghan army and police forces, which rely on the U.S. to buy much of their gear. 

Since the discovery, lawmakers have performed the requisite hostile question-and-answer sessions, grilling Army officials, who did not have many answers. The ammo embarrassment has itself become ammunition for lawmakers looking for their latest cause of the hour and self-serving sound bite. 

Defense contracting opportunities exploded in 2003, and AEY was one of many small companies that got in on the action. Unfortunately, it was the Army that hooked up with this unscrupulous opportunist. Is this an isolated case or are there other illicit gun runners and conmen-turned-contractor that defense officials might have missed? 

There has been at least one report that AEY fraudulently was listed as a Small Disadvantaged Business, making it eligible for a number of government set-asides. This is no surprise: If you look at Bandits around the Washington, D.C., Beltway, they (legitimately) wear similar labels. Most claim to be disabled vets to boot, qualifying them for additional opportunities. Though most of these disadvantaged, service-disabled veterans (driving those really nice sedans, though we’ve never seen any disability plates on these machines) are legit, this system that offers tremendous opportunities might continue to battle this demon of fraud.

How long will the mine-resistant, ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle love affair last? 

It seems high marks have been bestowed upon MRAP by in-theater operators as well as outer-limits stakeholders. MRAP is that massive and unwieldy vehicle, a heavily armored personnel transporter designed to withstand the current crop of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) — and maybe whatever else those dedicated freedom fighters can scrape together and detonate around U.S. forces. 

On the upside, numbers show these wheeled monsters with their V-shaped undercarriage have literally saved life and limb, so it’s no surprise they might be boosting the morale and confidence of the boys and girls in uniform — and a whole lotta body armor. Their day-to-day psyche is crucial to success (by any definition) on the ground and recruiting and retention on the home front. 

But how small is this window of bliss? 

Possibly pretty small, and it’s anyone’s guess when MRAP will join its older brothers and sisters in the Pasture of Obsolescence. Remember the Up-Armored HUMVEE? MRAP, though highly effective thus far, has a chink or two in its armor, sustaining some damage and a few injuries (possibly one fatality). Nothing’s perfect. 

MRAP buys some time — and this spending freefall is of concern. According to a DoD spokesperson, we’re talking $22.4 billion funded to date and more than 14,000 MRAPs ordered across the services. How much time until the next generation of weaponry — explosive or otherwise — from our not-so-friendly hosts bursts on the scene? The Joint IED Defeat Office in Washington, D.C., is working to attack the IED network and defeat the device. Despite a staggering $4 billion budget in fiscal 2008 alone and a staff clocking in at more than 300 people, we’re not deluding ourselves. 

Two things are certain: thousands of MRAPs and tens of billions of dollars blown out the fire hose on the IED five-alarmer. (We won’t bother with who’s getting those billions.) Given the MRAP’s major limitations — size, weight, fuel consumption — we are unsure if its rapid and large-scale procurement was prudent. We’re not so sure the services wanted as many as they ordered, but that’s just a hunch. 

It has been written that conceptually MRAP is at odds with a proven counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy. Maybe MRAP plays better to mom and dad (who vote) than COIN.

Gentlemen start your engines: The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) drag race is back on. The shipbuilding program that briefly was derailed because of out-of-control costs (and don’t blame the contractors on this one) apparently is firing up the boilers. The Navy has announced a new request for proposal (RFP) — customary at the beginning of the contracting process. Is this a new beginning? Not really. A March release announced the Navy was lifting its 2007 “stop work” order issued to Lockheed Martin (It canceled General Dynamics’ LCS-4 soon after.) These original contract awardees each have a ship well-underway to completion — LCS-1 and LCS-2 — and are the only companies included in the new RFP. It is our guess that suits at Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics are thinking better of traveling this highway to hell and potential financial ruin. (Back story: Last year, Lockheed Martin declined the Navy’s proposal for a fixed-price bad deal for LCS-1 after Lockheed Martin already had consented to a fixed-price contract on LCS-3. The new RFP calls for a fixed-price incentive fee on three ships, so we’re back where we were last year.) 

Confused? You’re not alone. 

The new cost cap per ship clocks in at $460 million, and in the past, the Navy has acknowledged its penchant for design dickering that has helped blow costs out the superstructure. But our source says even in the wake of stop-works, cancellations, and tremendous embarrassment for our men and women on Team Blue, during this new RFP the Navy is making yet more costly changes. The Navy has confirmed this, though not as eloquently as we’ve phrased it. Has anything changed? 

Check this out: According to our source, the new winner gets to build the next two ships and the second place company (or loser in this case) gets to build one, so everybody wins. But not so fast, this is LCS! Our source says the Navy reserves the right to award all three to one company. (Must be a fine-print thing.) The Navy neither confirmed nor refuted this gem. 

And that $460 million cap? “Politics!” is the word in the corporate passageway. It is alleged this is “some arbitrary number” from Northrop Grumman supporters on the Hill in an end-run to build more DDG 51s and DDG 1000s. 

Is this how we rebuild the Navy? Stay tuned!

FAT …
A. What defense contractors have gotten in recent years.
B. A term used to describe testing done on the first items produced under a contract.
C. A term used to described what did not happen with a whole lotta body armor
D. All of the above.The answer is

“D.” (Are we that transparent?) 

FAT is “first article testing” and government auditors at (get this) the request of a member of congress (who tipped her off?) have found FAT did not happen with a reported 13 of 28 Army contracts. About $3 billion in gear apparently escaped the testing that helps ensure a company can produce what it promised and detect any problems early. The FAT requirement is designed to save time and money. As a result, DoD really has no clue whether armor from those 13 contracts meets anyone’s standards. 

The Army guy who oversees the program apparently has said no deaths have been attributed to faulty body armor, which, according to our source, would take time to catch. But, hey, defective body armor is better than no body armor, he says, unless it is something about the plates themselves that kill you and not the bullet or shrapnel. (His view.) 

The concern here is the squandering of billions of dollars. While the Army is failing miserably in its explanation, stating it disagrees with the inspector general’s interpretation of the testing requirements (if you can believe that), chances are the body armor is more than adequate. It used to be millions, now billions seem to be tossed around without any fore- or afterthought. And oversight? The Army stood up its new contracting command March 14 at Fort Belvoir, Va., and its new director has pledged better contract oversight. We’ll see. Three billion under any system is a chunk of change, let alone when it is for gear designed help protect the kids in the sandbox. We understand the political grandstanding that has underscored with the body armor issue. As far as that $3 billion, our source surmised:
“Follow the money, and you’re going to find a retired general or a retired colonel from West Point.”

We disagree. Our guess is this mess was not that well-planned.

…Reserve Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Doug Stone has been tapped as the next commander for Marine Forces Reserve. He will replace current commander, Lt. Gen. John W. Bergman, later this year.

Stone is still in his current job as deputy commanding general, Multi-National Force – Iraq (Detainee Operations) and commanding general, Task Force 134. In short he heads up detainee operations, which could be slippery slope for anyone, but hey, after the infamous activities at epicenter Abu Ghraib, one can’t go anywhere but up, right? It seems he’s done quite the job during this past year such that Multinational Force commander, Gen. David H. (King David) Petraeus would prefer for Stone to stick around, according to sources. But, the future of the Marine Corps seems to have trumped current ops, and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James T. Conway is looking to the future.

Sources tell us Stone is making a change that should have been made long ago – he’s opening up an office in Washington, D.C., an addition to the job’s current New Orleans mooring. The head of the Navy’s reserve has long bounced back and forth between New Orleans and his D.C. office. The Army’s reserve chief also is in Washington. The Marine Corps Reserve is no longer a backwater so why should the command and commander be relegated as such?

But all may not be well in Marine Land. Stone seems to be a big-picture, joint, and international kind of guy … every bit the Marine, but not necessarily corporate Marine Corps. Seems like a positive – unencumbered by less-than-important distractions to better keep his force shakin’ with the Regulars and joint ops worldwide.

Breaking away from that Marine Corps Mafia so prevalent in New Orleans isn’t a bad idea either. Some on the active side charge he does not understand the Corps or its reserve. (Don’t they say this about almost everybody? Yeah, like Conway would pick some aloof, ne’er-do-well.) Sounds like a perception hurdle for Stone, but a strength for the long-term health of the force.

All things considered, not bad for a corporate (civilian) superhero (or so we hear) who pinned on his second star a year ago.

Amid a controversy that has been brewing for some time, lawyers for Guantanamo (GITMO) guest and former Osama bin Laden bodyguard and chauffeur Salim Hamdan have called for the case against their client to be dismissed. The reason: “Unlawful command influence” over commission defense and prosecution attorneys.
The latest motion cites, among other things, a September 2006 meeting that GITMO legal types had with Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England who reportedly stated, “We need to think about charging some of the high-value detainees because there could be strategic political value to charging some of these detainees before the election.” 

Unlawful command influence? Maybe not, or so we concluded after consulting with legal sources on both sides. Although unlawful command influence is always a concern in military justice, according to our most impartial source, the example cited by the Hamdan team might simply amount to prosecutorial discretion. He reminded us that this often happens, “try the high-profile cases first.” Although there is a right to a speedy trial (yes, the Hamdan case has dragged on for years), there is “no right to be tried in a certain order.” A district attorney will move up high-profile cases prior to an election. (Anyone seen “Law and Order” lately?) 

Let’s be honest: Few care about what happens to the GITMO guys. That said, the implications for the military justice system cannot be ignored. Is political influence undermining any standard of impartiality and, well, justice? The very public and prolific Air Force Col. Morris “Mo” D. Davis resigned as the commissions’ chief prosecutor because of this issue and has published a number of pieces slaying his former employers at DoD. (Given his passion, we are surprised he has not taken out a full-page ad in The New York Times or hired a bi-plane to tow his message across the skies above Washington, D.C.) If Davis and the Hamdan defense team are right, just toss out that “J” word and remove Lady Justice’s blindfold. Might as well burn the Uniform Code of Military Justice (there’s that “J” word again) while you’re at it, too. Clearly, this is a matter to be reviewed further by the competent, the knowledgeable, and the impartial. 

Back to Hamdan. While the defense has the advantage of pretrial publicity, this is not a luxury afforded to the prosecution. If we were making the books on this one, we’d lay odds that this latest Hamdan tactic is another attempt to get the prosecution to toss in the towel and deal on this low-value man from Yemen.